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The Arrow-Lind Theorem in a Continuum Economy
Abstract
In their stimulating contribution to the theory of cost-benefit analysis, Arrow and Lind showed that "when the
risks associated with a public investment are publicly borne, the total cost of risk bearing is insignificant and,
therefore, the government should ignore uncertainty in evaluating public investments... This result is obtained
not because the government is able to pool investments but because the government distributes the risk
associated with any investment among a large number of people. It is the risk-spreading aspect of government
investment that is essential to this result." Arrow and Lind proved their result from an asymptotic point of
view, letting the number of taxpayers grow infinitely large.
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Economic Theory | Income Distribution | Political
Economy
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/122
The Arrow-Lind Theorem in
a Continuum Economy
by
Roy Gardner
No. 61
1. Introduction
In their stimulating contribution to the theory of cost-benefit analysis,
Arrow and Lind showed that "when the risks associated with a public investment
are publicly borne, the total cost of risk bearing is insignificant and,
therefore, the government should ignore uncertainty in evaluating public
investments... This result is obtained not because the government is able to
pool investments but because the government distributes the risk associated
with any investment among a large number of people. It is the risk-spreading
aspect of government investment that is essential to this result."^ Arrow
and Lind proved their result from an asyTi5)totic point of view, letting the
number of taxpayers grow infinitely large. Private national income grew
large with the number of taxpayers, while the risk from government facing an
individual taxpayer grew very small. Indeed, in the limit, the intact of
the government investment relative to the private economy was negligible.
With so many things happening at once, it was not altogether clear that the
number of taxpayers alone was responsible for their striking result, although
2
Arrow and Lind so argued. In an attempt to clarify the situation, an alter
native approach, that of an economy with a continuum of agents, is adopted
3
here. Such a model enables one to consider an econony with a fixed, very
large number of agents, at the same time allowing the impact of risky
government investment to vary. The major result for such a model is that
the Arrow-Lind theorem holds as long as the government risk is very small
relative to the econony. A counterexample shows that if the government risk
is at all large, the Arrow-Lind theorem no longer holds, even though there
are a great many agents over whom to spread the risk. These results decide
the issue: only for small government risks is the total cost of risk
bearing necessarily insignificant.
2. Model and Results
In what follows, we adhere as closely as possible to the definitions and
notation of Arrow and Lind. Consider then an econoiny whose agents, called
taxpayers, belong to the set T « [0, 1]. The assumption that the econoiny
consists of many small agents is expressed by taking an individual agent to
be an infinitesimal subset dt of T. Since it is convenient to label agents
by points t in T, we will also consider t as a typical point in the small
set dt.
Each taxpayer t, 0 :S t ^ 1, has a twice differentiable and bounded
utility function of income Y(t). Since income Y can be random, each tax
payer is assumed to maximize expected utility, EU^(Y(t)). We require
boundedness to avoid paradoxes of the St. Petersburg variety; we assume in
view of differentiability that the risk aversion is defined
for all taxpayers and all values of income.
Taxpayer income Y(t) is given by
(1) Y(t) = A(t) + s(t) [B + X]
4 —
where A(t) is private income, B is the mean government return on investment,
2
is the random component of government return with mean zero and variance cTv>
and s(t) is the distribution of taxes (s(t) is continuous and non-negative).
Total private income is given by
a
A =
1 =
equals B.
A(t)dt, the tax distribution satisfies
0
r.1
s(t)dt, and total expected government return E
0
s(t)[B + X]dt
0
The risk premium TrCt) for taxpayer t satisfies by definition^
(2) EU^(Y(t)) = EU^(A(t) + s(t)B - irCt)).
Equation (2) expresses indifference on the part of taxpayer t to bearing his
share s(t)X dt of the public risk or paying n(t) dt out of his sure income
and bearing no risk. For a risk averter, risk aversion and the risk premium
are both positive. In this case, the risk premium represents a cost, namely
the cost to taxpayer t of bearing the risk of the government investment. The
total cost of risk-bearing is then given by the integral
„1
TT(t)dt.
0
Finally, a small risk is a random variable whose variance is arbitrarily small
We are now ready to state the following analogue of the Arrow-Lind
theorem for a continuum economy:
Theorem. Let the economy have a continuum of agents. Then the total cost of
bearing a small government risk is arbitrarily small.
Proof. Using Pratt*s result for small risks,^ the risk premium for taxpayer
t satisfies
(3) TT(t) = 1/2 r (A(t) + s(t)B) + 0(0^)* o(av) being terms of order
^ u X A
2
less than a .
Integrating over all the tax payers, one finds the total cost of risk bearing
,.1 O f.1 O «1
2 2s(4) n(t)dt = 1/2 J r^(A(t) + s(t)B)dt +
0
Both integrals on the right-hand side are obviously finite, so that for
arbitrarily small variance the total cost of risk bearing is arbitrarily
small.
dt
0
From (4) the only other case where the total cost of risk-bearing van-
,1 ^ .
r dt should vanish--this is that the agents of the econony
Jq t
on average are risk neutral. This is admittedly an extreme case. On the
other hand, for fairly large risks (3) no longer applies. In this case we
will show that even with an infinite number of agents, each bearing an
infinitesimal share of the risk, the total cost of risk-bearing is not
insignificant.
To this end, consider an econony of identical taxpayers:
U^(Y(t)) =-y"^
s(t) = 1 for all t
A(t) = A > 1
The government risk has positive mean B and X= 1 with probability 1/2 and
= -1 with probability 1/2. Equation (2) in this case becomes
ishes is if
Thus
-1
2Ca +B+1^ ''"2Ca +^-1^ ~A +^ - TT(t)
~ A R » total cost of risk bearingA T* «D
TT(t) dt = 1/(A + B") is positive.
0
Indeed, unless the variance of X decreases, there is no way for the total
cost of risk bearing to vanish.
3. Conclusion
Arrow and Lind's argument for ignoring the uncertainty associated with
public investment rested on a limit argument—applied to an economy with a
large and increasing number of agents. At the same time, since each agent
represented an addition to national income, the size of the government risk
became small relative to the economy. It was a priori possible that one or
both of these factors was responsible for the Arrow-Lind result, although
Arrow and Lind argued exclusively in terms of the former. What we have seen
is that, for a continuum economy, the decisive role is played by ,the latter.
Benefit-cost analysis safely ignores the uncertainty associated with public
investment only when that investment's risk is inherently small.
FOOTNOTES
1. Arrow and Lind, p. 366.
2. Arrow and Lind, p. 373.
3. Aumann and Shapley, Chapter VI, discuss the relationship between the two
approaches and various interpretations of the latter.
4. In Arrow and Lind, private income is a random variable. In order to focus
attention on public investment uncertainty, we have here supressed this
additional source of uncertainty.
5. Pratt, p. 124. Our TT(t) corresponds to Arrow and Lind's k(n).
6. Pratt, p. 125.
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